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    ABSTRACT 
 
 
Currency boards have often been at the heart of monetary reforms proposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF): they have been instrumental either as a short 
term crisis management strategy that successfully restores financial order for many 
countries seeking stabilization in the aftermath of prolonged economic crisis or as a 
way of importing monetary credibility as part of a medium / long term strategy for 
conducting monetary policy. As backbone of a credible exchange-rate based 
stabilisation programme, they have also been the linchpin of several heterodox or 
orthodox programmes aimed at mitigating hyperinflation. This paper attempts to 
synthetize our thinking about currency boards by reviewing their strengths and 
weaknesses and endeavours to seek real world examples to rationalise their 
applicability as opposed to alternative exchange rate regimes. Architects of 
international financial stability at the IMF or at central banks often ponder about the 
prerequisites for such programme to work well. These are also reviewed using 
appropriate economic theory where necessary.  Finally, this paper sheds light on the 
best exchange rate regime that may be adopted in the intermediate term by those 
countries wishing to adopt a currency board, not as a quick fix solution to end an 
economic chaos but rather, as integral part of a long term monetary strategy. 
  
 
 
Key Words: Currency Boards, IMF, Crisis Management, Monetary Credibility, 
Heterodox / Orthodox Programs, Hyperinflation, Exchange Rate Regimes 
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1. Introduction 
 
Currency Boards always hog the hemlines during episodes of acute financial turmoil. 
Understand by this, an official exchange rate arrangement that combines four main features 
(Enoch and Gulde (1998), Gulde (1999)):  
 
? The local currency is pegged to some foreign currency in the strongest fix that could be 
possible, short of outright ‘dollarization’; 
  
? The domestic monetary base (i.e stock of high-powered money) is fully covered by 
reserves of the foreign currency to which  the local currency is pegged2;  
 
? Automatic convertibility of domestic currency into the foreign currency on demand;  
 
? Strongest commitment to the system, effectively and duly guaranteed and enforced by 
Central Bank law e.g convertibility law in Argentina and the central bank charter of early 
1990s, making Argentina’s currency, then the austral, fully convertible into US dollars at 
the rate 10,000 australs per dollar, changeable only by act of congress3.  
 
In essence, a currency board can be viewed as a consolidated exchange rate and monetary 
package because of its direct implications for exchange rate and monetary management. For 
reasons that will be clear as we progress along with the discussion, it will be safe to view 
currency boards as a holistic package, including fiscal reforms as well.  In addition to lowering 
interest rates (partly because of accompanying lower probability of devaluation4 in the 
system), they derive much of their credibility from the “legal and institutional changes that are 
needed at the time of their inception” (Enoch and Gulde (1998)). This credibility stems from 
the establishment of an anchor that is neither overvalued nor undervalued and from the 
inception of commitment devices that impose some consistency of domestic polices with the 
external goal of maintaining the peg.  
 
Legal commitment involves the enactment of central banking act that enforces the operational 
jurisdiction of the currency board. Examples of institutional commitment devices include the 
                                                 
2 Expansions and contractions of the supply of base money ( and the corresponding movements in interest rates) 
are determined by foreign exchange inflows and outflows. 
3 At the beginning of 1992, 1 peso replaced 10,000 australs. Subsequently, the exchange rate became 1 peso for 1 
dollar. 
4 Lower interest rates are usually captured by narrowing interest spreads. For many emerging markets, this is 
captured by yield on Brady bonds less 5-year US Treasury bond yields. The probability of devaluation is smaller 
than that of a soft pegged exchange rate regime because of the stronger credibility and commitment to good 
monetary policy practice that currency boards command. It is important to note that devaluation is a possibility 
that is only used only under extreme conditions and that such possibility, no matter how small, is usually taken into 
account by architects who design the scheme. Devaluation is thus an ‘exit door’ policy option, in case the currency 
board arrangement imposes too many constraints on an economy that is buffeted by adverse shocks. 
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formal forbiddance to monetize government’s budget deficits and strict prohibition to act as 
Lender-Of-Last-Resort (LOLR) to commercial banks that face temporary liquidity problems.  
Together these institutional changes, backed by well-defined and enforceable banking 
legislation,  act as a successful coordination device for the public’s expectations and ensure 
that these beliefs change for the better overnight and succeed in achieving the goals for 
which the currency board regime was set up.  
 
The absence of any form of financing to the public treasury as well as to commercial banks,  
is what essentially distinguishes a currency board from a central bank. Table 1 summarises 
some of these differences.  
 
Table 1 – Differences Between A Typical Currency Board Arrangement and Central 
Bank5
  
                                   Currency Board  versus  Central Bank  
Typical Currency Board  Typical Central Bank  
Usually supplies notes and coins only  Supplies notes, coins, and deposits  
Fixed exchange rate with reserve currency  Pegged or floating exchange rate  
Foreign reserves of 100 per cent  Variable foreign reserves  
Full convertibility  Limited convertibility  
Rule-bound monetary policy  Discretionary monetary policy  
Not a lender of last resort  Lender of last resort  
Does not regulate commercial banks  Often regulates commercial banks  
Transparent  Opaque  
Protected from political pressure  Politicized  
High credibility  Low credibility  
Earns seigniorage only from interest  Earns seigniorage from interest and inflation  
Cannot create inflation  Can create inflation  
Cannot finance spending by domestic government  Can finance spending by domestic government  
Requires no "preconditions" for monetary reform  Requires "preconditions" for monetary reform  
Rapid monetary reform  Slow monetary reform  
Small staff  Large staff  
Note: The characteristics listed are those of a typical currency board or central bank (applicable to 
developing countries only), not those of a theoretically ideal or exceptionally good currency board or 
central bank. 
 
 Such absence implies that countries that move to currency boards, usually implement pre-
requisite measures to discipline their public finance situations as well as rehabilitate their 
commercial banks6. This disciplining mechanism, whilst providing a benign attempt at 
changing public expectations for the better, nevertheless does not come without pitfalls. 
Currency boards do represent a straightjacket for policymakers and leave them with little 
flexibility in their arsenal of manoeuvres when it comes to responding to external shocks. This 
                                                 
5 Material available from Hanke and Schuler (2000), “Currency Boards for Developing countries: A Handbook”. 
Available on: http://users.erols.com/kurrency/intro.htm
6 Being one of the ‘extreme’ forms of pegged exchange rate regimes, they ostensibly have all the advantages and 
drawbacks of soft pegs. These are listed in the Appendix. The point here, is that, in addition, due to these 
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weakness is atypical of the archetypal disadvantage of pegged regimes7: for economies that 
are strongly integrated in global capital markets, monetary policy cannot be used as a 
discretionary policy instrument to meet domestic objectives. For economies whose domestic 
interest rates are not tightly linked to world interest rates because of capital account 
restrictions, monetary policy is partially potent to influence output. Nonetheless, currency 
boards forego this advantage by restricting money supply by foreign reserves level.  Fiscal 
rectitude is enforced as a safeguard mechanism that ensures that reckless or profligate fiscal 
policy does not impinge on the government’s attempt to lower inflation rate.  
 
 Faced with a limited number of policy instruments on the demand side, any economic 
adjustments will have to come through the labour markets in the form of wages and price 
adjustments.  Thus, if an economy faces extreme shocks that move its real exchange rate 
away from its equilibrium level, adjustments that typically require nominal exchange rates to 
change to correct that disequilibrium cannot be made. Such adjustments will have to come 
through changes in price and wage-setting mechanism that will ostensibly impinge on 
domestic activity and employment. Countries that move to currency boards thus need to 
display increased flexibility in their labour markets and in their price-setting machinery as 
potential contingency measures against shocks.  
 
           Table 2: Summary of Advantages and Drawbacks of Currency Boards 
 
Advantages of currency board Disadvantages of currency board 
 
Credibility in monetary policy-making on 
three fronts: financial management, 
exchange-rate stabilization and monetary 
policy strategy 
 
 
Loss of monetary sovereignty 
 
Low interest rates due to lower probability of 
currency devaluation 
 
 
No crisis management measures available to 
banks facing temporary illiquidity problems 
 
 
Prompts reforms of banking system and of 
public finance due to absence of LOLR and 
of debt monetization 
 
No room for adjustment to external shocks: 
nominal exchange rate cannot be used to 
respond to shocks that move the real 
exchange rate away from its equilibrium 
level. Due to monetary and fiscal restraints, 
there is little room for demand management 
policies when it comes to responding to 
external shocks. This response needs to be 
provided by labour market institutions. Thus, 
adjustments tend to take a longer time and 
are more painful 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
advantages, they also result in lower rates, greater credibility and act as a disciplining device for public finance and 
commercial banking because of the legal and institutional changes that accompany their  inception. 
7 See Appendix for a general discussion of pegged regimes 
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Commitment devices that ensure sustainability and credibility of currency boards: 
 
- Reform of banking system 
- Setting up of contingencies (for banks and treasury) in case of financial crises 
- Labour market flexibility and wage flexibility 
- Peg is chosen at a level that is neither overvalued nor undervalued 
- Reform of public finance situation 
 
 
 
The credibility issue that surrounds the inception  of such ‘hard pegs’, ensures that currency 
boards are not subject to speculative attacks on currency or banking crises on the same scale 
as soft pegs. The aggregate reserve constraint ensures the former. Ex-ante rehabilitation of 
the banking system ensures the latter. As such, judged from a cost-benefit analysis, it 
appears that performance-wise, currency boards ‘pareto improve’ on soft pegs in that they 
retain all advantages, deliver more in successfully anchoring expectations of private agents 
and contain the drawbacks of soft pegs. 
 
 In practice, the case for a currency board has actually been levelled on three fronts:  
 
? Financial Management Strategy  - Many emerging market economies have adopted 
currency boards as a contemporary crisis management measure and a future crisis 
prevention mechanism. Countries like Bulgaria (1997) and Argentina (1991) have 
used this argument to validate the inception of their currency board programmes. The 
anchor properties of the hard peg and the legal and institutional commitment 
mechanisms guarantee the former attribute while the disciplining influence induced by 
pre-requisite reform of institutions in the economy, result in the latter. 
 
? Disinflation Strategy – Some economies have embraced currency boards as an 
exchange-rate based stabilization mechanism that seeks to credibly lower 
expectations of inflation overnight, especially in cases when this inflation level is very 
high and dismantles all financial and contractual arrangements of the economy. In 
these circumstances, the population generally avoids using the domestic currency in 
financial transactions because of lack of intrinsic purchasing value for the currency. 
The destabilization of domestic financial contracts results in the absence of any lower 
bound on the inflation rate. As such, any mechanism that correctly coordinates the 
private sector’s expectations on the right outcome, will be deemed to be credible. The 
success of the implementation of that credible coordinating mechanism depends on 
the time horizon being considered to reduce inflation.  
 
The old adage involved in mitigating hyperinflation holds sway: High inflation may 
always and everywhere be a monetary phenomenon but the end of all high inflation is 
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always and everywhere a fiscal phenomenon. In the long term, the legal change that 
is enshrined in the domestic country’s central banking legislation together with 
monetary constraint and the disciplining device of enhanced fiscal rectitude, contain 
the seeds of an implicit device that can successfully subdue inflation. Private agents 
who rationally anticipate the intertemporal link between monetary constraint and fiscal 
rectitude, will lower their expectations and successfully bring inflation to zero. Since 
introduction of such fiscal restraint may take time to be implemented, it is the 
announcement of future monetary and fiscal discipline that complements the legal 
changes made to central bank law and that adds impetus to credibility at the shorter 
end of the time horizon. 
 
? Monetary Strategy - Countries that lack the domestic financial infrastructure that is 
required to successfully run a floating regime with well-defined monetary policy, have 
sought to derive the benefits of added credibility and disciplining mechanism inherent 
in a currency board by introducing it as part of a long term monetary strategy that 
aims at stabilizing interest rates and exchange rates. For those countries, the 
existence of unbroken contracts acts as a non-negligible lower bound on the inflation 
rate that can be attained. The requirements for successful stabilization here go 
beyond the frontier of legislation changes. Legal factors, institutional factors and the 
exchange rate peg, if appropriately designed, help piggy back on the partner 
economy’s credible monetary policy. At the same time, it provides a mechanism that 
ensures that the peg will be operative in an environment that is devoid of currency 
crises or of governmental budget crashes possibilities.    
 
For some countries that have chosen to adopt the currency board as long term monetary 
strategy, the existence of non-dismantled contracts means that it may be rather more difficult 
to lower inflation expectations as quickly as under the disinflation category. These economies 
may still face moderately high inflation before their currency boards become fully operative. 
Others may fail to pre-commit to reduce their inflation rates because of idiosyncrasies of their 
economies. These countries are likely to face unwarranted costs in the run-up and may find 
the transition to a currency board extremely painful. To assuage the severity of these 
transitions, some form of ‘interim’ regime is highly recommended. This paper will eventually 
throw light on the best form of interim regime that may be adopted. 
 
Section 2 reviews the debate between fixed and floating exchange rate regime and explores 
the structural features that may favour the adoption of a particular category of exchange rate 
regime. Section 3 explores the notion of credibility that underpins the role of currency boards 
in its triple role of short term financial management of the macroeconomy, in exchange-rate 
based disinflation programmes and in long-term monetary management. Section 4 provides a 
synopsis of the pre-requisite institutional and structural features needed before a currency 
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board becomes fully operative and successful in the mission it has been setup to achieve. 
Section 5 explicates the best form of the interim regime needed while countries implement 
necessary reforms before tying their monetary hands permanently. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Fixed vs Floating Exchange Rate Regime Debate 
 
The fixed vs floating exchange rate regime debate has long haunted architects of the 
international global financial system, keen to find ways to make the global financial system 
more robust and resilient to potential instabilities. Ultimately, this debate boils down to two 
questions:  
- Are the features of the economy compatible with a fixed or a flexible exchange rate 
system in the first instance?  
- Given the adoption of a particular form of exchange rate regime, what factors ensure its 
smooth operation   i.e how can credibility be achieved?   
 
If the whole gamut of exchange rate regimes is viewed as a line that connects ‘hard’ pegs 
(currency boards, full dollarisation and monetary unions) on one side  and pure floats on the 
other (pure floats, central bank independence and inflation targeting), with a variety of 
intermediate arrangements (bands, pegs, crawls) in between, then the choice of the most 
appropriate exchange rate regime depends on the interplay between structural features, the 
overriding objectives for which the exchange rate regime has been set and how these 
objectives affect the resulting institutional setup that is needed for the regime to be viewed as 
‘credible.’ 
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                                 Table38:     Exchange Rate Regimes - Classified 
 
 
 
Pegged Exchange 
Rate Regimes 
Intermediate Regimes Floating Regimes 
Hard Pegs – 
Regimes where 
the irrevocable 
peg is supported 
by institutional 
and policy 
commitments 
(currency 
boards, 
dollarisation, 
monetary 
unions) 
Soft Pegs – Regimes 
where the authorities 
aim to defend a pre-
determined value / 
path of an exchange 
rate without the 
institutional 
commitment to fully 
devote monetary 
policy to the sole 
objective of 
maintaining the peg 
(single pegs, basket 
pegs, crawling pegs, 
crawling bands ) 
Tightly Managed 
Floats – Regimes 
where authorities 
attempt to keep 
exchange rates 
stable by heavily 
monitoring or 
controlling exchange 
rate movements, 
without a 
commitment to a 
predetermined path 
Pure Floats – 
Freely floating 
regimes 
(coupled with 
central bank 
independence 
and inflation 
targeting) 
 
Being one of the ‘extremes’ under the notion of hard pegs, currency boards seem appropriate 
for countries whose structural features are designed to suit and accommodate  some sort of 
fixed exchange rate arrangements in the first instance. These structural features can be 
taxonomised as follows: 
 
(i) Trade structure and pattern 
? High openness of economies to trade of goods and services with a dominant trading 
partner (with trade accounting for a high proportion of GDP); 
                                                 
8 Source: Andrea Bubula and Inci Otker-Robe (2004):  “The Continuing Bipolar Conundrum”, Finance and 
Development, March 2004  issue 
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? Trade is dominated by products whose prices are denominated in domestic currency 
terms and characterised by constant terms of trade (e.g manufactured goods). 
 
(ii) Domestic financial  sophistication and extent of integration 
? Low degree of integration into the global financial system with flows of ‘hot’ money being 
low by developed country standards;  
? Low degree of domestic financial sophistication and inadequate financial infrastructure in 
the form of poor and thin financial markets9;  
 
(iii) Inflation Stabilisation 
? Because of high inflation or monetary disorder, inflation stabilisation is an attractive 
objective and the country is willing to give up monetary independence for the sake of 
imported credibility that anchor provides; 
? If inflation stabilisation is the main objective, country can pre-commit to reduce the 
inflation rate ex-post, once the peg has been adopted. 
 
(iv) Domestic Shocks 
?    Economy has propensity to face financial / monetary shocks more than real shocks. Fixed 
regimes are more attractive from an output stabilization perspective. 
 
(v) Successful pre-conditions for  adoption of fixed exchange rate  regime10
? Flexible labour markets and the wage-setting process, being unhindered by complex 
contractual arrangements; 
? Fiscal Flexibility to respond to shocks but overall rectitude maintained; 
? High level of international reserves; 
? Similar shocks as partner country; 
? Country’s financial system extensively uses currency of partner country; 
 
Most countries adopting some form of fixed arrangements for their currency regimes, exhibit 
two or more of the above stylized facts, although option (v) seems to be less evident among 
less developed countries under fixed exchange rate arrangements. 
                        
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  There are many ways financial markets may be weakened: illiquid bond / debt market, narrow foreign exchange 
markets, undercapitalised banking systems, banks with balance sheets depicting large currency mismatches, lack 
of prudential regulatory and supervisory structure. 
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                               Table 4:   Fixed v/s Floating Debate – Template 
Economic Facts Fixed Exchange Rate 
Regime 
Floating Exchange Rate 
Regime 
Lack of credibility in inflation-
stabilization ex-ante ?  
Inability to pre-commit to low 
inflation rates ex-post 
 
       ? Note 1 
Increased integration in 
global financial markets 
 
Note 2 ? 
Domestic financial 
sophistication 
 
Note 3 ? 
Trade as % of GDP (High) 
    ?(A)  
Agricultural exports as % 
share of trade 
 
   ?(B) 
Manufacturing exports as % 
share of trade    ?(C)  
Monetary Shocks ?  
 
                        
Real domestic shocks  ? 
External shocks  
        ?Note 4 
Liability dollarisation 
(financial and banking 
structure) 
           ?Note 5         ?Note 6 
Flexibility of labour markets ?  
Fiscal flexibility ?  
                                   
Note 1: Countries that cannot pre-commit to low inflation rates ex-post usually choose some form of compromise 
between anchor properties of fixed and accommodating properties of flexible regimes. Arrangements that fall into 
this category include crawling pegs, crawling bands and adjustable pegs. 
 
Note 2: Fixed exchange rate regimes are compatible with increased integration if and only if the domestic banking 
system is strong enough to resist any interest changes needed to defend the peg. 
 
Note 3: Domestic financial sophistication is taken to mean the existence of a deep and broad market for foreign 
exchange, the market for foreign exchange derivatives instruments, institutional requirements such as independent 
central banks and inflation targeting. 
 
Note 4: External shocks include oil price hikes, global interest rate fluctuations, volatility in terms-of-trade 
 
Note 5: Fear-of-Floating argument 
 
Note 6: Floating regimes may have a disciplining influence by limiting the extent of future liability dollarisation. 
 
(A) To economize on transaction costs and minimise exchange rate risks. 
(B) Agricultural exports are denominated in foreign  currencies (exports volumes  are insensitive to fluctuating 
exchange rates) and subject to volatile terms-of-trade. 
(C) Manufacturing exports are denominated in home currencies (exports are thus sensitive to exchange rate 
changes) and stable terms-of-trade. 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Similar to proposals of  Mundell’s (1961) Optimal Currency Area (OCA). 
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Feature (i) (Trade structure and pattern, pp10) encapsulates idiosyncratic shocks that 
characterise the trade sector. Fluctuating terms-of-trade have a non-negligible impact on the 
economic performance of highly open island economies through the income effect.  
 
One instance in which this matters for the choice of the exchange rate regime is the resulting 
implication of excessive exchange rate fluctuations on trade volume for countries that have a 
high trade-GDP ratio. This matters for debt sustainability considerations of these economies if 
the Net-Present Value of debt to exports ratio is used as primer gauge of their future solvency 
stance. Another potential relevance is the nature of the main exportable product and the 
currency-denomination of pricing policy. Many small island economies that rely extensively on 
tourism receipts as their main exportable, opt for flexible arrangements if tourism services are 
priced domestically in dollars11 and fixed regimes if these services are denominated in home 
currency12. It is thus not strange that, using the trade argument, Caribbean island economies 
peg their currencies to the US dollar under their currency board.  
                         Table 5:   Countries embracing Currency Boards13
Currency Boards and Currency Board-like Systems as of June 2002
Country Population
GDP 
(US$) Began Exchange rate / remarks
Bermuda [UK] 
 63,000 $2 billion 1915 Bermuda $1 = US$1 / Loose capital controls 
Bosnia 3.8 million $6.2 billion 1997 1.95583 convertible marks = 1 euro / Currency board-like 
Brunei 336,000 $5.6 billion 1952 Brunei $1 = Singapore $1 / Currency board-like 
Bulgaria 7.8 million $35 billion 1997 1.95583 leva = 1 euro / Currency board-like 
Cayman Islands 
[UK] 35,000 
$930 
million 1972 Cayman $1 = US$1.20 
Djibouti 450,000 $550 million 1949 
177.72 Djibouti francs = US$1 / Currency board-
like 
Estonia 1.4 million $7.9 billion 1992 8 kroons = 0.51129 euro / Currency board-like 
Falkland Islands 
[UK] 2,800 
unavailabl
e 1899 Falklands £1 = UK£1 
Faroe Islands 
[Denmark] 45,000 
$700 
million 1940 1 Faroese krone = 1 Danish krone 
Gibraltar [UK] 29,000 $500 million 1927 Gibraltar £1 = UK£1 
Hong Kong [China] 7.1 million $158 billion 1983 
Hong Kong $7.80 = US$1 / More orthodox since 
1998 
Lithuania 3.6 million $17 billion 1994 3.4528 litai = 1 euro / Currency board-like 
 
                                                 
11 Fluctuating currency does not affect the demand for tourism because of dollar pricing policy. These economies 
have the option of keeping their exchange rate fixed or allowing it to fluctuate. While a flexible regime will not 
affect demand for tourism, it allows economy to respond to shocks – which is not possible under a fixed regime. 
12 With prices denominated in home currency terms, demand for tourism will be sensitive to fluctuating currency 
changes. A fixed regime will do a better job at stabilising overall demand. 
13 Available on: http://users.erols.com/kurrency/intro.htm.  Kurt Schuler Copyright © 
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Economies in transition that adopt the currency board and, for which the trade argument is 
relevant, include Bulgaria (Lev pegged to the Deutsche Mark (before 1999)), Brunei whose 
currency is pegged to the Singapore dollar, Namibia and Swaziland whose currencies are 
pegged to the South African Rand. Through a harmonised trade and cyclical pattern with the 
partner economy, external shocks to the system are mitigated and the need to implement 
drastic and painful policy or structural adjustments will not be necessary. In cases where 
countries exhibit a diversified trade pattern or structure, the option of policymakers is to adopt 
a compromise regime that juxtaposes the anchor properties of a currency peg and the desire 
to display reasonable flexibility in responding to particular trade shocks. Countries in this 
category choose to peg to a basket of currencies, representing the country’s major trading 
partners.  
 
The second and third features encapsulate the inherent and much documented notion in the 
academic literature on the choice of exchange rate regimes: the “impossible trilemma” – you 
cannot have fixed exchange rate regimes, perfect capital mobility and monetary policy 
independence at the same time !  In addition to lost monetary sovereignty, countries that are 
deeply integrated into the global financial system, run the risk of facing speculative attacks on 
their currencies. Capital flows have nowadays become very responsive to changing 
fundamentals or to adverse shifts in market sentiment. The various episodes of financial 
turmoil in early 1990s in Europe, are nothing but a poignant reminder of  this. Liberalisation of 
the financial system in the presence of explicit government guarantees and lack of adequate 
macroeconomic and regulatory / supervisory policies, have resulted in pegged regimes being 
fragilised on a large scale. Countries that have underestimated this powerful law of 
international finance, have ostensibly paid a high price. Evidence abounds in the East Asia 
debacle of 1997. The dangers of this financial fragility are even made more intricate when one 
realises that a country caught in the quagmire of financial depression, with persistent capital 
outflows and facing the prospect of a serious threat of an attack on its currency, cannot use 
monetary policy in order to restore macroeconomic and structural balance.  
 
To cope with the subtleties of a potential crisis looming, these countries must have strong 
domestic financial infrastructure that will enable them to muster resources they need to 
withstand large interest rate changes needed to stall capital outflows. Alternatively, they may 
need to impose capital controls as a way of restoring their ability to use monetary policy for 
domestic purposes or they may contemplate moving to some flexible exchange rate 
arrangement. 
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Key Results: 
 
 
Table 6:  Risks facing a country that adopts a pegged exchange rate regime: Threats to credibility 
and sustainability 
 
Threats to sustainability of a pegged regime include: 
 
? Risks associated with increased global market integration - speculative currency attacks and 
impotence of monetary policy 
 
? Risks of increased capital flows – pre-requisites for successful defense of the peg require interest 
rate hikes  which may fragilise the banking system 
 
? Pre-eminence of external shocks – inability to use nominal exchange rate as policy instrument. 
Labour market must display flexibility to absorb these shocks 
 
? Inability to pre-commit to low inflation rates ex-post – risks of real currency appreciations and of the 
resulting current account deficits. The subsequent reliance on inflows of foreign capital, especially 
short-term debt, makes economy oversensitive to interest rate differentials. 
 
Note: Reasons for inability to pre-commit to low inflation rates include: inflation inertia due to sluggish adjustment in wages and 
prices, Balassa -Samuelson (1964) productivity-differentials hypothesis and excessive reliance on seigniorage money to finance the 
budget deficit. 
Corollary 1:  A country facing a high (low) degree of international capital flows, will prefer to 
adopt a flexible (fixed)  exchange rate regime; 
 
Corollary 2:  A country with a high degree of international capital mobility can adopt a fixed 
exchange rate regime, if and only if, its banking and financial system are strong enough to 
resist any extreme adjustments (in the form of higher interest rates) needed to ward off a 
speculative attack against the peg; 
 
Corollary 3: A country with a low degree of international capital mobility can adopt a flexible 
regime, provided it has a strong domestic financial system and a deep, broad and liquid 
foreign exchange market.  
 
Economies that are in the radar screens of foreign investors, need to protect themselves 
against the dangers of currency or real exchange rate misalignments caused by disruptive 
capital flows, either by ensuring strong domestic financial system or, at least,  have some 
regime of capital flows restrictions like a Chilean-type of taxes on capital inflows14. If they do 
not, the threats to the viability of the currency board system and the perenity of its success as 
a credible exchange rate regime, will be severely put into question. Alternatively, they may 
allow their currencies to move within a narrow band against the foreign currency of the 
dominant partner country.  Argentina’s inception of a currency board, was an attempt to 
convince the world that it would refrain from the option of an inflationary policy in the future. 
Similarly, Estonia and Latvia, with no record of monetary disorder after decades of Soviet 
Rule, hoped to piggy back on low inflationary reputations by setting up a currency board after 
                                                 
14  Stanley Fischer (2001) argues that caution must be exercised as to the type of capital controls, since they serve 
different purposes. Controls on capital inflows are made to prevent excessive capital inflows from leading to 
currency overvaluations or to influence the distribution of capital inflows towards long term capital and away from 
short run disruptive capital inflows; controls on capital outflows are essentially undertaken to  prevent devaluation 
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independence. Currency boards may also originate as a legacy of the colonial era as a 
mechanism that allows the imperial ruler  to run the colony’s monetary policy and benefit from 
seigniorage money created in that colony  e.g  Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Why does the exchange rate regime matter for an Emerging Market Economy (EME) ? 
 
Stylized facts of many emerging market economies (EMEs): 
 
1. Lack of domestic financial sophistication 
2. Increased integration in global financial markets 
3. Trade structure dominated by diversified trade portfolio or manufacturing 
4. Liability dollarisation  is a feature of corporate and banking balance sheets 
5. History of monetary disorder /  high inflation 
 
 Fixed Exchange Rate Floating Exchange Rate 
Credibility Argument Lack of domestic financial 
sophistication 
Financial prerequisites for a float are existent e.g central 
bank independence and inflation targeting 
Disinflation /  Exchange-Rate 
Stabilization Program 
History of acute monetary 
and financial disorder. 
Country is willing to tie its 
monetary hands for sake of 
increased credibility in form 
of, say, a currency board 
Country cannot pre-commit to reduce inflation ex-post 
but wants to compromise between stability (anchor 
properties of peg) and flexibility (allowing exchange rate 
to change in a way that maintains real exchange rate 
constant). Flexible arrangements that fall in this 
category include crawling-pegs, adjustable pegs  
Insulation Argument Manufacturing exports where 
goods are priced in home 
currency and face constant 
terms-of trade 
Agricultural exports where goods are priced in foreign 
currency and face fluctuating terms-of trade Note 2 
 Pre-eminence of monetary 
shocks 
Pre-eminence of real shocks 
Balance Sheet Effect due to 
Liability Dollarisation 
“Fear of Floating” Argument To discourage quasi-insurance situation created by peg. 
Floating regime acts as a disciplining device that 
discourages the country to borrow in foreign currency in 
the future 
Financial Fragility Argument Country can adopt fixed 
regime, provided that it has 
the financial resources and 
resilience to withstand any 
large interest rate hikes that 
are necessary to defend the 
peg. In other circumstances, 
country can have control over 
monetary policy by adopting 
capital controls.
Open economy trilemma:  With fixed exchange rate 
regime, there is no monetary souvereignty and 
speculative currency pressure may exist with increased 
global integration. Floating regimes can accommodate 
monetary independence and offer little ground for 
speculative currency pressure. 
Note 1:   The above table summarises the theoretical arguments for adopting a particular exchange rate regime for 
an EME characterised by stylized facts (1)-(5). Material inside the box depicts the general features of the economy 
that will validate the adoption of a particular form of an exchange rate regime under a given argument. 
 
Note 2:   EMEs can adopt both fixed or floating regimes under this argument. However, while both regimes will 
leave volume of exports unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations (given foreign currency denomination of 
domestic pricing policy), floating regimes pareto improve on fixed regimes by providing an extra leeway to 
respond to external shocks. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of the currency precipitated by a herding behaviour of investors in moments of panic and to give allow country to 
have independent control over monetary policy. 
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Table 8:   Why does the exchange rate regime matter for small island economies ? 
 
Stylized facts of small island economies: 
 
1. GDP <  $ 10 bn 
2. Trade dominated by one product (high % of GDP) e.g pre-eminence of tourism sector 
3. Low integration in global financial markets 
4. Lack of domestic financial sophistication 
5. Liability dollarisation ? 
 
 Fixed Exchange Rate Floating Exchange Rate 
Policy Instrument Argument No possibility of using the 
exchange rate as policy 
instrument   Note 1 
 
N / A 
Insulation Argument Manufacturing exports 
(stable terms-of trade)   OR 
Agricultural exports (volatile terms-of trade)      OR 
 
 
 
Dominance of Tourism sector 
where pricing of services is in 
home currency   OR 
Dominance of Tourism sector where pricing of 
services is in foreign currency     OR 
 Pre-eminence of monetary 
shocks 
Pre-eminence of real shocks 
Liability Dollarisation Fear-of-Floating  N/A 
Credibility Argument  Lack of domestic financial 
sophistication and low 
integration in global financial 
markets 
Financial sophistication and all prerequisites for a 
successful inflation target 
 
Note 1: With highly open economies whose imports are characterised by existence of exchange-rate pass-throughs, a currency devaluation is 
accompanied by inflation . As a result, there is no impact on the real exchange rate. Attempts to use devaluation to improve the current account 
balance or to influence output,  remain futile 
 
 
Currency boards are much favoured among small island states15. It is not hard to see why: for 
one, this seems to portray their economic loyalty to their colonial ties. Small island economies 
have a high proportion of trade as a % of GDP and, as aforementioned, their trade is often 
dictated by the price of one main agricultural product. As a matter of convenience, they must 
earmark a sufficiently high amount of foreign exchange reserves to finance much of that trade 
(many countries use the  reserves-imports cover ratio (defined in terms of number of months 
of imports that can be covered by the reserves level) in order to gauge the strength of the 
reserves level). A comparison of the reserves-GDP ratio to the high-powered money-GDP 
ratio in the economy, suggests that in many instances, the reserve level is already high 
enough to cover the full monetary base (the two ratios could be interpreted as roughly 
equivalent). Thus, instituting a currency board regime can be effectuated without much 
transition or set-up cost. This problem may prove to be acute for large and relatively closed 
economies. These economies do not keep their foreign reserve level at a high level because 
                                                 
15 Hanke and Schuler (2000) argue that the concept of ‘large’ or ‘small’ economies is disturbingly confusing and 
is not relevant to analysis of exchange rate regime choice. They argue, “…..Even accepting the terms "large," 
"small," "open," and "closed" as meaningful for monetary policy, experience suggests that the objection has no 
practical significance for the currency board system. Currency boards have been successful in small, open 
economies such as Hong Kong and large (populous), closed economies such as Nigeria and British East Africa, 
which initially had little trade with the outside world. Currency boards opened previously closed economies by 
providing sound currencies that encouraged trade…..” (Section 6, ‘Does size matter  ?’ ) 
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of relatively lower weight of trade in the economy. Thus, there is not much to provide for in 
contingency terms. But the relatively large size of the economy means that the level of 
monetary base is high. Thus there is a huge gap between the foreign exchange reserves-
GDP ratio and the high powered money-GDP ratio.  Setting up a currency board may mean 
incurring enormous setup costs with non trivial implications. The notable exception to this rule 
is Argentina (1991) whose economy is much larger than small island economies. Many would 
nonetheless argue that the convertibility law and the central bank charter ( the two legal 
underpinnings for Argentina’s currency board) were enacted at a time when Cavallo was 
running out of options and any drastic measures would seem to work16.  
 
There has also been proposals for large economies (such as Ukraine and Russia) to form 
currency boards to end their prolonged periods of distress. Indonesia fretted with the idea of 
instituting a currency board during the onset of the East Asian crisis of 1997. Aside from the 
fact that some of these economies are relatively closed and that financial fragility (in the form  
of weakened banks and firms with Soft Budget Constraints (SBC)) has somewhat been 
lessened, these economies face structural costs, associated with their intrinsic transition 
features. Both Russia and Ukraine are trying to seek accession to the EMU. To be successful 
in this endeavour, they must satisfy the prerequisite criteria for convergence, both, in the 
macroeconomic and structural fronts. Transition problems will mean that if their inflation levels 
display a strong element of inertia17, they could face the danger of having overvalued 
currencies and the accompanying costs in terms of mounting current account deficits and 
great reliance on short term external finance. To converge, their productivity levels must be 
higher than those of current EMU states. This could feed into higher price of non-tradables 
and lead to (temporary) inflation divergence and add an extra dimension to the inflation bias 
story. The rule of thumb here is that, as a price to pay, these economies will have to accept 
living with the bitter reality of high inflation, even temporarily, until they have converged to 
standards dictated by productivity bias of the “Balassa-Samuelson” effect (1964)18.  
 
                                                 
16 In 1991, Peronist president, Carlos Menem appointed Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard graduate,  as his economy 
minister. Under the Cavallo Plan, stringent fiscal reforms were introduced and a currency board system was setup, 
backed by genuine political will. The currency board had an impressive impact on inflation, which dropped from 
over 800% in 90s to around 5% in mid 90s.   
17 Reasons for high inflation inertia include, amongst others: excessive reliance on government seigniorage finance 
(in the face of a shaky tax revenue collection system); higher productivity in tradable goods sector than that of 
main partner countries a la Balassa-Samuelson (1964); strong wage-price spiral through institutional setup, 
excessive capital inflows. The issue of higher productivity is highlighted in the main text. High inflation inertia 
(through the slow convergence of prices to international standards) explains why exchange rate pegs adopted with 
a counter inflationary aim, may lack credibility. In practice, failure to bring fiscal rectitude underpins this lack of 
credibility.  
18 (Taken from Szapary: Finance & Development, June 2001, Volume 38, No. 2): The Balassa-Samuelson (1964) 
effect arises because the growth of productivity differs among sectors, while wages tend to be less differentiated. 
Typically, productivity growth is faster in traded goods sector than in non-traded goods sector such as services. To 
the extent that faster productivity growth in traded goods sector pushes up wages in all sectors, the prices of non-
traded goods relative to the price of traded goods will rise. Szapary (2001) uses this argument to assert that 
accession countries experienced faster productivity growth than EU countries during the catching-up process. 
Hence, other things being equal, the consumer price index will rise faster in the former than in the latter.   
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Architects of currency boards must not be oblivious to such factors when deciding upon its 
design. Economies in transition must make provision for allowing their inflation rates to 
deviate for a while, with the hope that they will eventually fall and converge to international 
level. In the interim process with an inflation rate which is above that of their main trading 
partner, these economies are almost likely to face high current account deficits. Given the fact 
that these economies are almost likely to attract short term inflows and a significant proportion 
of these inflows are likely to be intermediated through their banking systems, this should be 
accounted for in the design of a currency board scheme. 
 
Policymakers must be wary of judging the economic circumstances and making comparisons 
based on those circumstances. Russia and Ukraine were not facing economic chaos at the 
time when proposals were being made for them to implement currency board arrangements. 
Their contractual systems were unaffected in real terms and their requirement for instituting a 
currency board stemmed essentially from the need to import external credibility. In economies 
that do not face financial disorder but that nonetheless want to adopt the currency board as 
part of a long term monetary strategy, the presence of unaffected contracts and unblemished 
institutions means that the arrangement needs to be underpinned by the right accompanying 
setup to be viewed as credible. Another economy in transition, Bulgaria, successfully 
mitigated its hyperinflation in 1997 relatively quickly through a currency board but had 
different reason for instituting such a scheme: that of ending the economic chaos and bringing 
financial discipline. With hyperinflation hitting high, all contractual arrangements in Bulgaria 
were dismantled. There is no floor acting as a lower bound on prices. Gulde (1999) argues 
that the currency board ended the economic turmoil ‘almost overnight’ in Bulgaria because of 
its positive impact on expectations. Whilst these idiosyncrasies do not apply unequivocally to 
the debate, it must be pointed out that the impact of high inflation on the real value of 
contracts matters for determining the speed of adjustment of any exchange-rate based 
stabilisation program. 
 
In general, moving to a currency board as part of a long-term monetary strategy, needs 
successful implementation of certain necessary pre-conditions that must be fulfilled in order 
for the board to operate smoothly without frictions. Prominent among these conditions include 
the need to decide on the appropriate choice of some ‘interim’ exchange rate regime that 
must be adopted to ensure that the transition to the currency board is as smooth as possible. 
This temporary regime must be easy to administer, quick to implement and, most importantly, 
help contain any costs incurred while moving to a currency board.  
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3. Credibility Issues in Choice of Exchange Rate 
Regime 
 
 
Credibility in the art of monetary policymaking and macroeconomic management, is restored 
by a mechanism device that correctly anchors the expectations of the private sector on the 
right outcome. An exchange rate regime, together with an appropriately designed institutional 
setup, can provide this credible anchor.  The literature on the relationship between exchange 
rate regimes and the notion of credibility in monetary policy is typically divided into two 
groups: those who favour the “extremes” ( extreme hard pegs and pure floats ) or  so-called 
“corner solutions” including Stanley Fischer and those who advocate the so-called 
“intermediate” arrangements (crawling bands, crawling pegs, adjustable pegs, managed 
floats, soft pegs to single or basket of currencies ) like John Williamson.  
 
Alongside currency boards in the line of the hard pegs and possibly, with much tighter 
restrictions, lie Monetary Unions and Dollarisation as two alternative ways of deriving 
credibility under hard pegs.  Monetary Unions, like the European Monetary Union (EMU) and 
the Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), have goals nested in long 
term ambitions that necessarily span beyond the confines of economics orthodoxy to 
embrace frontiers as wide as the political or social spectrums. Deeply rooted in the desire to 
form such unions, lie the possibility of enhanced intra-region trade, the possibility of having a 
wider market enabling firms to reap benefits from scale economies, the dynamic implications 
for investment resulting from greater cross-country corporate activities and the lower 
transaction costs and exchange rate risks associated with a single currency. 
 
 A number of microeconomic and structural criteria will altogether define whether a group of  
countries exhibit any syndrome of cyclical and structural convergence  - the prime test 
determinant of accession of  prospective countries to a monetary union. These criteria have 
carefully been taxonomised by Mundell (1961) in an optimal currency area theory and include, 
amongst others, the degree of trade openness and pattern of trade between prospective 
members, symmetry of shocks, labour market flexibility and the existence of a federal system 
that promotes equality in growth among all members through taxes and transfers for the 
whole region. Structural features (e.g structure of corporate finance for firms, level of private 
indebtedness of households, structure of the housing market19) can also potentially be added 
                                                 
19 A country’s housing market may affect the decision as to whether it must join a monetary union or not. This was 
particularly relevant for the UK for three reasons:  (1) The ratio of house price to income has important 
implications for wealth and macroeconomic performance – if this ratio is volatile, then it can lead to  output 
changes that differ in terms of cyclical timing with existing EMU countries; (2) Many home-owners incur 
substantial level of private indebtedness when purchasing their homes ( the UK has the highest proportion of 
mortgaged-homeowners in Europe): their financial situation is very much contingent on monetary policy and 
hence interest rates.  As such, an inappropriate level of interest rate could spark off financial disaster amongst 
households. In a monetary union, the interest rate level set by the supra-national monetary authority, will cater for  
the economic interests of the whole region, rather than for the interest of one specific member country alone. The 
 20
to this list. The political costs of ignoring these are often high and are only accounted for, in 
the aftermath of a severe financial collapse.  
 
                                     Table 9:  Monetary Unions   
 
Individual advantage lies in collective benefits from being in groups (positive spillover 
effects from group to country) and group advantage lies in ‘contribution’ from each 
member  (positive spillover effects from country to group) 
 
Theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) 
 
1) Extent of trade integration and coherence of economic structure ( and convergence 
of patterns of trade cycles) 
2) Symmetry of economic shocks facing countries 
3) Labour market and wage / price flexibility 
4) Fiscal transfers across regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For countries that suffer from sudden financial disorders and that need a quick mechanism for 
restoring credibility, it is inconceivable to imagine how forming part of a monetary union can 
prove to provide a short term remedy to restore credibility in the financial system. For one, 
countries must satisfy the Mundell (1961) criteria, as outlined above. Most monetary unions 
enshrine these conditions in their legislation and portray them practically as tests for 
convergence which prospective entrants must satisfy in the short / medium term. 
Notwithstanding the time constraints that this entails, the need to adhere to prudent economic 
policies (e.g budget restraints ) that may compromise serious domestic aims for the sake of 
convergence,  makes any government question the validity of monetary unions. On the other 
hand side, the political costs of waiting that long before all economic tests for convergence 
have been met, are often too high to warrant joining a union. Forming a union requires looking 
out for credible partner with the same regional and political  ambitions and seeking to derive 
joint benefits from an enlarged economic space. 
 
 Competing closely with monetary unions high in the list of hard pegs, is ‘Dollarisation’ or 
simply the notion of adopting the dollar (or any major currency) as official legal tender. For 
many years the largest economy to be officially dollarized was Panama, which has used the 
U.S. dollar officially since 1904. In early 1999 the government of Argentina stated that it 
sought a formal agreement with the United States to become officially dollarised. Argentina or 
any other country can become officially dollarised even without a formal agreement but there 
may be economic and political benefits to a formal agreement. Ecuador also fretted with the 
idea of embracing dollarisation20 in 2000 and has abandoned its currency, the Sucre, in 
                                                                                                                                            
EMU interest rate levels may be set at a level that is  inappropriate for the UK. On these grounds, a monetary 
union is clearly not warranted as option; (3) An interaction between (1) and (2) can often lead to financial fragility 
of banks and to financial disintermediation. Judged by the results of these three structural  “sub-tests”, the decision 
for  the UK to stay out of the EMU, can be rationalised. 
20 The Economist, 2000 
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favour of the dollar21. About 30 dependencies and independent countries currently have 
official dollarization.  
 
                      Table 10a:  List of economies embracing Dollarization 22  
Economy Population GDP ($bn) Political status Currency Since
American Samoa 67,000 0.5 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1899 
Andorra 68,000 1.2 independent 
euro (formerly 
French franc, 
Spanish peseta), 
own coins 
1278 
British Virgin Islands 21,000 0.3 British dependency U.S. dollar 1973 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 600 0.0 Australian external territory Australian dollar 1955 
Cook Islands 21,000 0.1 New Zealand self-governing territory New Zealand dollar 1995 
Cyprus, Northern 140,000 0.8 de facto independent Turkish lira 1974 
East Timor 857,000 0.2 independent U.S. dollar 2000 
Ecuador 13,200,000 37.2 Independent U.S. dollar 2000 
El Salvador 6,200,000 24.0 Independent U.S. dollar 2001 
Greenland 56,000 1.1 Danish self-governing region Danish krone 
before 
1800 
Guam 160,000 3.2 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1898 
Kiribati 94,000 0.1 independent Australian dollar, own coins 1943 
Kosovo 1,600,000 ? U.N. administration euro 1999 
Liechtenstein 33,000 0.7 independent Swiss franc 1921 
Marshall Islands 71,000 0.1 independent U.S. dollar 1944 
Micronesia 135,000 0.3 independent U.S. dollar 1944 
Montenegro 700,000 1.6 semi-independent euro (partly "DM-ized" since 1999) 2002 
Monaco 32,000 0.9 independent euro (formerly French franc) 1865 
Nauru 12,000 0.1 independent Australian dollar 1914 
Niue 2,000 0.0 New Zealand self-governing territory New Zealand dollar 1901 
Norfolk Island 2,000 0.0 Australian external territory Australian dollar 
before 
1900? 
Northern Mariana Islands 75,000 0.9 U.S. commonwealth U.S. dollar 1944 
Palau 19,000 0.1 independent U.S. dollar 1944 
Panama 2,800,000 16.6 independent U.S. dollar, own balboa coins 1904 
Pitcairn Island 42 0.0 British dependency New Zealand, U.S. dollars 1800s 
Puerto Rico 3,900,000 39.0 U.S. commonwealth U.S. dollar 1899 
San Marino 27,000 0.9 independent 
euro (formerly 
Italian lira), own 
coins 
1897 
                                                 
21 Administrators of the United Nations announced in 2000 that  the dollar would be the official interim currency 
of East Timor which got independence from Indonesia in that same year. 
22 Available on: http://users.erols.com/kurrency/basicsup.htm.  Kurt Schuler Copyright ©  
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Tokelau 1,500 0.0 New Zealand territory New Zealand dollar 1926 
Turks and Caicos Isands 18,000 0.1 British colony U.S. dollar 1973 
Tuvalu 11,000 0.0 independent Australian dollar, own coins 1892 
U.S. Virgin Islands 120,000 1.8 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1934 
Vatican City 1,000 0.0 independent 
euro (formerly 
Italian lira), own 
coins 
1929 
 
 
                                     Table 10b:  Officially Dollarized (US$) Economies, June 2002  
Economy Population GDP ($bn) Political status; other remarks Since
American Samoa 67,000 0.5 U.S. territory 1899 
British Virgin Islands 21,000 0.3 British dependency 1973 
East Timor 800,000 0.4 Independent 2000 
Ecuador 13,200,000 37.2 Independent 2000 
El Salvador 6,200,000 24.0 Independent 2001 
Guam 160,000 3.2 U.S. territory 1898 
Marshall Islands 71,000 0.1 Independent 1944 
Micronesia 135,000 0.3 Independent 1944 
Northern Mariana 
Islands 75,000 0.9 U.S. commonwealth 1944 
Palau 19,000 0.1 Independent 1944 
Panama 2,800,000 16.6 Independent; issues own coins 1904 
Pitcairn Islands 47 0.0 British dependency; also uses New Zealand dollars 1800s 
Puerto Rico 3,900,000 39.0 U.S. commonwealth 1899 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 18,000 0.1 British colony 1973 
U.S. Virgin Islands 120,000 1.8 U.S. territory 1934 
 
A country wishing to dollarize its economy will face long term costs that are too great to 
warrant its inception as part of a short / medium-term policy package. Dollarization is the right 
choice for countries that are well integrated in trade and finance with the US or that whose 
financial system extensively use the dollar (e.g financial contracts characterised by liability 
dollarization).  For these economies, the ability of the government to create money through 
seigniorage is limited, given the extensive use of dollars in the financial system. Thus, the 
costs of relinquishing seigniorage revenue by moving to full dollarization, are minimal. 
Another category of countries which may find it relatively less costly to move to full 
dollarization includes those for which the use of currency devaluation as ‘exit’ option in crisis 
periods, proves futile. Countries that fall into this category include those with high exchange 
rate pass-through parameter (so that a currency devaluation is accompanied by inflation 
which offsets the effect on competitiveness) or those characterised by balance sheet effects 
(so that a currency devaluation is contractionary).   
 
 
 
 23
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11:   Devaluation Policy  - conditions under which  devaluation policy can be used as 
policy instrument 
 
Currency devaluation can be used to 
 -     stimulate output 
- stimulate the current account  (boost up reserves level)  
- increase competitiveness of home goods 
 
A.  Circumstances under which a currency devaluation is contractionary 
 
- Balance sheet effect due to liability dollarization 
- Re-distribution channel 
- De-collateralisation channel 
- Deflation channel 
- Marshall-Lerner pessimism 
 
(Note: the last circumstance applies primarily to the current account. All the rest applies to output) 
 
B.  Circumstances under which a currency devaluation is neutral 
 
 - (concerns the current account primarily) Economies with trade accounting for a very high % of GDP and 
characterised by high exchange rate pass-through parameter 
 (Devaluation – inflation - no change on competitiveness) 
 
 - (concerns output primarily) Economy characterised by real wage rigidity  
 (Devaluation – inflation – nominal wages ) 
 
C. Circumstances under which a currency devaluation is expansionary 
 
(Demand-Side) 
- Interest rate channel 
- Expenditure-switching channel 
 
(Supply-Side) 
 - Economy characterised by less than full real wage rigidity 
 
 Under dollarization, the country forfeits the ability to use currency devaluation as policy 
instrument. The economy will be subject to the vicissitudes affecting the US economy and its 
economic cycles will portray intimate movements and cyclical mappings with those of 
America23. But, the accompanying loss of monetary sovereignty and the inability to disburse 
emergency funding to the banking system in crisis times, may prove to be unabashedly high. 
If a short / medium term financial disorder requires quick-fix solutions with so many strings 
and whistles, then it is more convenient to leave these frailties as they are. Such a disorder 
requires a solution that compromises between credibility in the monetary management, 
flexibility in operation of the regime and versatility to minimise the costs of its adoption. 
Judged by these criteria, currency boards seem to do better than dollarization.  
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                          Table 12:  Dollarization   v/s   Currency Boards 
 
      Dollarized economies :     1)       Lower interest rates (zero risk of devaluation) 
2) Complete loss of monetary sovereignty / No seigniorage 
3) No exit option in crisis / troubled times 
 
 
  Characteristics of countries that may benefit from ‘Dollarization’ 
 
- Well integrated with USA in financial and trade structure terms 
- Economy already uses dollars extensively (e.g liability dollarization is present in the banking 
sector and in the corporate sector) 
- Economy does not lose anything from ‘losing’ the ‘exit option’  e.g  countries that cannot use 
nominal exchange rate as policy instrument because currency devaluation is contractionary or 
neutral 
The other ‘extreme’ end of the exchange rate spectrum, pure free floating exchange rate 
regime, has also harnessed much support from academics and policymakers alike. The 
general consensus among advocates of pure free floats, is that the much sought credibility 
issue in monetary policy and the urgent need to restore financial order can also be obtained 
under pure floats, although the literature here has delved more deeply on issues surrounding 
monetary policy designing and derivation of optimal policy rules. In this realm, one can think 
of accompanying free floats with strategic issues like giving central bank operational or 
instrument independence from the government and establishing a clear mandate to achieve a 
particular level of inflation (inflation target).  
 
One way in which central banks can showcase their commitment to adhere to the inflation 
target, is to refrain from targeting other nominal variables simultaneously (although, room 
must be allowed for central banks to manoeuvre if other macroeconomics variables such as 
the exchange rate fluctuations, can force the central bank to deviate from its target). This 
strategy of combining free floats with independence of central banks and inflation targeting, 
has borne fruits in many countries. From the initial pioneers New Zealand, UK, Canada and 
the US, this approach has received much adherence among emerging market economies like 
Brazil, Turkey and South Africa. The list of countries under this method, is poised to show a 
remarkable increase over the next few years. However, the sensitivity of results shown in the 
literature is very much dependent on the methodology adopted. What constitute a ‘free float’ 
(under the IMF’s version of a free float) on paper may not necessarily be so in practice. 
Several countries have free floats but their central banks actually engage in reserve 
interventionist policies in order to keep their exchange rates within manageable level. In the 
debate on the relevance of currency boards, the pivotal issue of the structure of the economy 
(which validates whether a country should show more inclination to fixed rather rather than 
floating regime), cannot be bypassed.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Ostensibly, most of the criteria for joining a Monetary Union still hold for countries showing any incline to 
dollarise their economy. The only difference is that, here, the notion of convergence must be with the US 
economy.  
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4. Preconditions for Exchange Rate Regimes to Work 
 
 
It is an undeniable fact that the 1990s was plagued by a “hollowing-out” of intermediate 
arrangements, with an increasing number of emerging and developed countries moving 
towards extreme hard pegs or pure floats.  
 
It is a fact that following the Mexican crisis of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the 
financial crisis that swept across Russia and Brazil (1999), intermediate exchange rate 
arrangements such as soft pegs have been weakened. Fischer (2001) argued that: 
 
 “…of the 33 countries classified as emerging markets by J.P.Morgan or Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI), the proportion with intermediate regimes fell from 64% to 42% 
over the decade. By the end of the decade, 16 of these countries had floating rates and 3 had 
very hard pegs in the form of currency boards or no legal tender. The remainder had 
intermediate arrangements: 5 crawling bands, 1 horizontal band, 1 crawling peg, 7 fixed pegs. 
The hollowing out of intermediate regimes among emerging market economies has continued 
since the end of 1999, with Greece moving from a horizontal band to membership of Euro and 
Turkey from a crawling peg to a float. 
 
Hollowing out was also evident among the developed economies during the 1990s, a process 
dominated by the creation of the euro and the demise of the European exchange rate 
mechanism. By the end of 1999, half of the economies characterised as developed by MSCI, 
had very hard pegs and almost half floating rates. Only one - Denmark – had an intermediate 
regime in the form of a horizontal band…..”.  
 
 The rationale for this fragility of soft pegs lies with the growing cross-border linkages that 
have increased the exposure of countries with pegged regimes to volatile capital flows and 
speculative attacks on the pegs24. Emerging markets such as Chile, South Africa and Poland 
that has portrayed their loyalty to pure floating regimes have managed to avert financial crises 
of 1990s.  Their strategy which consists of the adoption of pure free floats together with a 
strict regime of inflation targeting and central bank independence, has led to amazing results 
in terms of inflation management. Brazil and Mexico have, since recently, stepped into the 
bandwagon and have recorded spells of good and strong monetary management.  
 
As highlighted in the introduction, the need to build exchange rate mechanism that can safely 
and effectively reduce inflation bias and improve on monetary management, relies on the 
design of complex safeguard mechanisms in the form of appropriate institutions.  According to 
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Duttagupta et al. (2004), instituting a flexible exchange rate regime with clear inflation 
targeting mandate to an independent central bank requires several conditions. Authorities 
must ponder about the merits of adopting point vs interval targeting and about  the need to set 
a timetable to give the central bank full operational and instrument independence. A timetable 
must be set to develop a deep and liquid foreign exchange market, a viable foreign exchange 
derivatives market. Above all, the nature of government involvement, if any, in foreign 
exchange matters, must be spelt out.  
 
Under all circumstances, the timing of capital account liberalisation needs to be appropriate. 
Liberalisation before moving to flexibility may introduce the dangers of pegged regimes in the 
run-up to embracing floating rates. Liberalisation after adopting floating rate may risk 
introducing biases in exchange rate misalignments. An economy that is more open to inflows 
than outflows, for instance, may find its currency experiencing real appreciation biases if it 
liberalises after having moved to floating regime. Like any major overhaul of an economic 
system engineered to bring credibility through reform of economic institutions, these factors 
take substantial time to implement 
 
   
Table 13:  Risks in Moving from a Pegged Regime to a Pure Float: 
 
(1) Exchange rate fluctuations pass-through on inflation  - the need to develop a credible anchor for 
monetary policy and developing institutional prerequisites to accommodate that anchor 
 
(2) Balance sheet effects due to exchange rate risks – Development of risk-management techniques /  
derivatives /  limit exposures 
 
(3)  Timing of capital account liberalisation 
 
- Liberalisation before flexibility ?  Dangers of fragilising the pegged regime whilst in transition to 
flexibility 
- Liberalisation after flexibility ?  Risks of biased exchange rate misalignments  depending on whether 
liberalisation is more geared towards inflows or outflows 
 
                                                                                                                                            
24 In a similar line of thought, the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the 1970s. High imported inflation from 
America, inconsistency between domestic and external aims, incapacity of domestic economic structure to support 
a fixed exchange rate regime, were all advocated as potential reasons for the breakdown of Bretton Woods..  
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  Table 14: Timetable for Moving from a Pegged Regime to a Floating 
Regime
Fixed Peg Limited 
Flexibility 
Considerable      
Flexibility 
Pure Floats 
 
Fully-fledged 
Inflation 
Targeting 
                  Groundwork for Inflation Targeting and Independent Central Bank 
                Building up Exchange Rate Risk Management Capability 
                 Development of Foreign Exchange Market  
Formulating Interventionist    
Policies 
  
 
For  ‘hard pegs’ , the design of appropriate institutional reforms involves undertaking 
appropriate reforms of  the public finance system, a rehabilitation of the banking system and 
the adoption of full  flexibility in the labour market and in the price-setting machinery.  
 
Countries that have utterly underestimated the importance of public finance reforms, have 
suffered the agony of having to live with a system that does not respond to their most 
pressing economic aims, often with disastrous medium term results. Because of the strongest 
fix provided by the regime, coupled with automatic convertibility, a currency board only helps 
to restore credibility if it is duly removed from the ambit of due accountability to the 
government. For this reason, countries that have met success with currency boards, are 
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actually those that have made it mandatory to have formal rules, enshrined in central bank 
law, that formally prohibit  the financing of budget deficits.  
 
Countries proceed by establishing a sophisticated treasury system and a deep and liquid 
market for debt as well as by improving their accounting standards. Because of poor financial 
infrastructure, the government in these countries find it costly to implement such changes and 
to raise finance. This generates into chronic monetary disorder and harnesses all ingredients 
susceptible of fuelling inflation. Typically, for the debt market to work, it is imperative that a 
proper savings culture is preached and that the whole mechanics of bond financing is made 
understandable to the public in a way that does not does not crowd out private sector 
investment and that does not jeopardise future ability for the government to generate 
revenue. 
 
For countries seeking fiscal reforms and consolidation, the enactment of budgetary rules that 
prohibit excess government spending, is appropriate. Fiscal rules, when appropriately 
designed, help fulfil a short-term fiscal stabilisation role and a medium-term fiscal discipline 
purpose. The former implies that rules must not prevent the government from engaging in 
counter-cyclical policies where necessary. The latter has implications for fiscal sustainability 
and, ultimately, the national savings level and national debt.  
 
What is special about currency boards that make the need for imposing fiscal rules stronger? 
Typically, the first generation models of currency crises point out some of the dangers 
associated with persistent budget deficits and monetisation of these deficits: if the domestic 
policies are inconsistent with the task of maintaining a soft peg, speculators will mount a 
speculative attack against the currency and wipe off all foreign exchange reserves, in what 
would seem to be the outcome of a rational play. Currency boards are stronger than soft pegs 
though ! The credibility notion in a currency board means that the possibilities of currency 
devaluation, are very low Therefore, we need a much more thorough theoretical paradigm to 
make the case for imposing fiscal rules stronger under currency boards. 
 
The model of Sargent and Wallace (1981) on debt credibility can cast out some light in that 
realm. Sargent and Wallace (1981) argued that the government’s monetary hands and fiscal 
hands are inextricably linked through the intertemporal budget constraint. With a currency 
board, the government’s monetary hands being tied, it can only finance its spending through 
bond issues. To finance part of repayments that now fall due, the government issues further 
bonds and the whole process goes on, thereby giving it the nature of playing some sort of 
Ponzi-game. The danger associated with such a policy is that it brings closer, the date at 
which maximum ‘tolerable’ debt limit is reached and at which debt credibility collapses.  The 
government will ultimately be forced to resort to monetary financing to meet up its spending 
commitment accumulated over years – which puts into question the whole purpose for which 
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the currency board has been set. The dangers associated here are twofold: firstly, such 
monetary financing is against the rules of the currency board – thus, if agents rationally 
assess that this is going to be the case in the future, they will never believe that the currency 
board will be successful in the first instance. Thus, the currency board may fail to adjust 
expectations correctly and engage the economy into a painful adjustment path which fails to 
deliver results; secondly, and in the same line of thought, if agents anticipate that the currency 
board is fragile and easily reversible, the currency board will fail to appear as a credible 
regime. Both factors compound each other and lead to a self-defeating purpose for instituting 
the regime. 
 
In any regime that ties the government’s monetary hands, provision must be made to prevent 
government spending from rising to unsustainable levels. This may be done through an 
appropriately designed system of fiscal rules. The interrelatedness and deep level of 
connections among countries under this form of extreme pegged regime, mean that the 
interdependence aspect must be taken into account when rationalising the case for imposing 
fiscal rules. These rules also have the role of mitigating a negative externality that one 
country’s profligate fiscal policy may potentially have on its partner. 
 
Flexibility in the labour market is an important prerequisite so that wages and prices will 
become the new shock absorbers. Countries usually take their own idiosyncrasies into 
account when deciding upon the best natural response. Less Developed Countries, for 
instance, may face hurdles when deciding upon making labour markets more flexible – in the 
form of trade union opposition. The low level of financial sophistication - as evidenced by 
weak financial markets (or virtual inexistence of bond markets) coupled with an economy 
riddled with underground economic activities and overwhelming tax evasions - means that 
governments do not rely on taxation or bond finance to collect revenue. Rather, the 
government almost always turns to the central bank to finance its activities through open 
market purchases. That provides an explicative power as to the disorderly high inflation rates 
in many Less Developed nations, not to mention the high degree of imported inflation pass-
through and wage-price spiral.  
 
Removing the power of the central bank to excessively monetise government fiscal deficits, is 
thus a strategy that needs careful and well articulated moves. To begin with, governments 
may show opposition to institution of such a regime as any attempt to dent inflation will 
inevitably mean deprivation of the opportunity to generate an inflation tax revenue of its own 
choosing – and thus, starve their treasuries. Contingency plans must also be enacted as 
insurance mechanism for ensuring a smooth transition to a currency board regime. 
 
 30
5. Best ‘interim’ regime in the run-up to Currency 
Boards  
 
Whilst preparing to join the EU and seeking to meet the criteria embodied in the Maastricht 
Treaty, Central and Eastern European economies faced a conundrum about the choice of 
interim regime to ensure stability, maintain competitiveness and promote structural reforms. 
Different exchange rate regimes were adopted with varying degrees of success. Estonia 
enjoyed inflation rate close to the EU average, thanks to its currency board. The Czech 
Republic adopted a similar disinflation strategy with a pure float. Poland had a wide-band 
crawling peg while Hungary had a narrow band crawling peg.  
 
Despite this diversity, Spazary (2001) argues that accession countries shared a number of 
features that made identification of some common interim regime relatively easy:  “…first, 
their wages and price of non-traded goods (were) lower than those of EU countries and in line 
with the Balassa-Samuelson effect (1964)25, will rise faster than prices in the latter as these 
transition economies catch up; second, their economies remain vulnerable to volatile capital 
flows; third, they faced structural price adjustments that go beyond the confines of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect(1964) because of their ongoing structural reforms and 
liberalisation; fourth, because of the importance of trade in their economies, a small loss of 
competitiveness will translate into (permanent) deterioration of the Balance of Payments…”  
 
Given these features, a soft peg leads to stability but given real rigidities in the product and 
labour markets, was not tenable. A flexible exchange rate regime would have allowed for 
gradual appreciation of the real exchange rate in line with the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
(1964) but was not recommended given the short term international capital volatility these 
economies were exposed to. Some compromise could potentially have helped achieve the 
twinned goals of stability and orderly real appreciation.  Most transition economists would 
recommend the adoption of some system of crawling peg for that endeavour. 
 
For countries whose economic transition may be met with severe structural and 
macroeconomic difficulties, the costs incurred during transition may be contained by the 
appropriate design of some form of flexible arrangement. If low inflation is the overriding aim 
but the country cannot pre-commit to that low level, the adoption of some ‘interim’ regime, that 
could potentially minimise such costs without harming the main objectives enshrined in the 
arrangement, is highly recommended. A crawling peg or an adjustable peg regime is often 
recommended when inflation rate in a country is higher than that of its main partner 
economies and ability to lower inflation rate to the levels of these partner economies is not 
feasible in the short term because of pre-commitment problems. 
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The strategy consists of adopting a crawling peg system which is a system of allowing the 
peg to change (the so-called ‘crawl’) in line with inflation differentials, so that competitiveness 
(measured by the real exchange rate) is preserved and the need to have mini devaluations is 
minimised. 
 
A crawling peg may be an “active crawling peg” system or a “passive crawling peg system”. In 
an active system, the rate of crawl is pre-announced for up to one year in advance with the 
objective of influencing expectations and price-setting behaviour. It represents a gradualistic 
approach to disinflation that was adopted by Israel and Latin America in 1980s and Poland in 
1990s.  For such system to be effective in anchoring expectations, the rate of the exchange 
rate crawl must track the pathway of inflation as close as possible so as to avoid the need to 
have recourse to mini-devaluations. For this, the authorities must have a serious commitment 
to the arrangement and face costs from abandoning it. In a passive system, the exchange 
rate parity is adjusted for past inflation. This system has the advantage of avoiding the 
tendency for the real exchange rate to appreciate out of line of economic fundamentals and 
generate huge current account deficits.  However, whilst it provides a stabilising effect for the 
real exchange rate, it does not help stabilise expectations 
 
Crawling pegs may be less costly to the economy because they do not try to achieve 
credibility immediately; instead, the crawl can decelerate to a hard peg when the central bank 
seems to have enough credibility to maintain a hard peg without high real interest rates or 
extensive foreign-exchange controls. Another way in which a crawling peg may be less costly 
to the economy than a hard peg is that if expectations of inflation pervade behavior and long-
term contracts, a crawling peg reduces the shifts of real wealth that occur with a suddenly 
imposed hard peg. 
 
Crawling pegs also enable the economy to allow its inflation rate to deviate temporarily from 
that of its partner economies without inducing the dangers of a major currency devaluation – 
which can be potentially destabilising and pernicious to the ultimate objectives of setting the 
currency board. By keeping the currency well in control and by preventing serious 
misalignments, the right economic and structural setup is created. Through proper interaction 
with an appropriately designed institution and well articulated administrative changes, the 
right atmosphere is set for currency boards to work and achieve their long term desirable 
results26.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
25 See footnote 18 
26 For a comprehensive overview of administrative and structural reforms needed in the prelude to a 
currency board, refer to Gulde (1999) “The role of the currency board in Bulgaria’s stabilisation”, 
Finance and Development, December Edition, IMF Publication 
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Table 15:  Exchange-Rate based Stabilization Programs (disinflation strategies) 
 
Rationale for failure of stabilization programs; 
 
(1) Inability to pre-commit to low inflation rates  
   
Why ?     
 
- Balassa-Samuelson Myth (1964) 
- Inflation inertia 
- Public finance indiscipline e.g due to debt monetization or lack of alternative financing 
possibilities 
- Initial price liberalisation 
 
 
(2) Inability to bring fiscal restraint / fiscal rectitude e.g inconsistency of domestic policy aims 
with external goals of maintaining the peg (Tequila, Asia, Tablita) 
 
 
Practical Ways of getting out of the doldrums: 
 
 - Crawling pegs / bands or Adjustable pegs  -   tries to adjust nominal exchange rates in line 
with inflation differentials so as to maintain the real exchange rate constant + avoid the need 
for mini currency devaluations 
 
 - Basket Currency pegs – maintains the anchor properties of the peg and allows adjustment 
to external shocks for countries with diversified trade portfolio 
 
  - Initiate ‘hard’ pegs that force consistency of domestic policies with the external goals of 
maintaining the peg ( e.g  currency boards)  
 
The main disadvantage of a crawling peg is that it can accelerate, rather than decelerate to a 
hard peg. Countries that have tried crawling pegs have generally had higher inflation than 
other countries in their regions that have maintained harder pegs punctuated by occasional 
devaluations. A crawling peg does not change the governance or the incentives of the central 
bank, so it is little more credible than a hard peg. In addition, countries with very high inflation 
tend to have no long-term contracts in domestic currency because the domestic currency is 
not a reliable unit of account, so a sudden, credible end to inflation does not cause big shifts 
of real wealth from debtors to creditors. Consequently, a crawling peg has no significant 
advantage for a country with very high inflation (say, more than 100 per cent a year) 
compared to a hard peg. For a country with moderately high inflation (say, 20 to 100 per cent 
a year), whatever advantages a crawling peg may have can be duplicated by means of a 
parallel currency or by de-indexing indexed wages and prices. 
 
One of the practical difficulties of crawling pegs (with bands) is that when the exchange rate is 
driven to the limit of the band, these arrangements work similar to and face the same 
difficulties as soft pegs. For emerging markets that are well integrated in global financial 
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systems, this makes them vulnerable to speculative currency pressure. The Currencies of 
Mexico (1994), Indonesia (1997), Russia (1998) were all in crawling band arrangements. 
 
The approach adopted by South American countries to exchange-rate based disinflation 
strategy differed significantly across countries. However, it highlights some of the problems 
faced by countries when they fail to design the exchange rate system appropriately or 
implement its prerequisite measures. In late 1970s, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay turned to 
exchange-rate based strategy in the hope of taming inflation27.  The Tablita was designed 
with the aim of bringing inflation down by featuring a declining rate of currency depreciation 
against the dollar.  The rate of inflation decrease was lower than the declining depreciation 
rate. With home inflation exceeding that of the USA and currencies depreciating at a slower 
rate than inflation differentials, several countries experienced massive real currency 
appreciations e.g Argentina failed to stabilise inflation successfully in 1970s through a 
crawling peg. The rationale was mainly failure to bring fiscal rectitude and failure to implement 
prerequisites for the crawling peg to work. 
 
Argentina’s currency board, whilst successfully taming inflation rate from over 800% in early 
1990s to under 5% in mid-1992, suffered a setback when continuing inflation in the first years 
of the convertibility plan, led to real appreciation of the peso by 30%. Brazil introduced a new 
currency, the Real, and shifted in 1995, to a fixed upwardly crawling peg system in the face of 
substantial real appreciation. Inflation dropped from 2,700% in 1994 to under 10% in 1998. 
The crawling peg system failed because of failure of Brazilian government to implement fiscal 
prudence. Inadequate measures to reduce debts and deficits also led to failure of crawling 
peg regimes in Mexico. Mexico initially fixed its peso to the US dollar at the end of 1985, 
moved to a crawling peg in 1989 and to a crawling band in 1991. The government kept a level 
ceiling on the peso’s appreciation but, tablita-style, announced each year after 1991, a 
gradually rising limit on the currency’s allowable depreciation. Despite this flexibility, the peso 
appreciated sharply in real terms and large current account deficit emerged.  
 
The rationale for failure of crawling-pegs in Brazil and Mexico emerged essentially from their 
failure to reform their fiscal stance appropriately. When speculators attacked their currencies, 
interest rates rose significantly and the banking system and the government budgetary 
payments came under enormous pressure. Attempts by their governments to bail out the 
banking system led to contingent liabilities, which further exploded the budget. This event was 
in stark contrast with Chile. The Chilean government introduced a flexibly managed crawling 
peg system in 1980s but successfully avoided the woes of Mexico and Brazil through careful 
implementation of reform programmes prior to adoption of the crawling peg. Chile gave its 
central bank independence, recapitalised its banking system and adopted a sound regulatory 
and prudential supervisory infrastructure. A key element in the success of the Chilean 
                                                 
27 The program was called ‘Tablita’  
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program was the adoption of the Chilean-type of tax. This is a requirement that every dollar 
invested in Chile needs to be accompanied by 30% non-interest bearing deposit. In a sense, 
this is a form of tax designed to discourage short term disruptive capital inflows -  and, as 
such, make the economy immune to excessive real appreciation that accompanies short term 
inflows and excessive real depreciation that accompanies the future exodus of capital. 
 
Evidence shows that countries that have tried to control inflation through some system of 
crawling-peg but that failed to match the rate of inflation decline with the rate of depreciation 
decrease, have suffered deep recession when the peg was abandoned. Countries with thin 
domestic financial system rely extensively on foreign currency borrowing (partly helped by the 
fact that they have pegged regimes – which ostensibly, encourages borrowing in foreign 
currency.)  After abandoning the peg, they usually suffer a deep recession and high 
inflation28. A devaluation of the currency lowers the profitability of firms. It also increases the 
risks for banks that have lent money by reducing their collateral. This leads to moral hazard 
issues as the banks are faced with a high proportion of non-performing loans. To mount up a 
defence against the depreciation, the central bank increases interest rates (which leads to 
adverse selection among borrowers). For instance, Mexico (1988) had inflation of over 100%. 
Pegging to the dollar enabled it to reduce inflation to around 7-8% in 1994. Abandonment of 
the peg led to re-apparition of inflation of over 50%. Argentina (1990)’s currency board helped 
reduce inflation from over 1000% in 1989 to less than 5% by 1994. After collapsing, inflation 
was rampant again. 
 
The decline in the number of countries under currency board regimes fits well into the 
ideology that, they have been viewed as medium-term measures to end economic chaos in 
those countries or as ways to cope with idiosyncrasies that require some credible tightening 
to begin with. Nonetheless, once credibility is restored, countries seemed to embrace the idea 
to remove this straightjacket and move to some flexible arrangements that can accommodate 
their internal and external goals. Currency boards could thus be viewed as the ‘most flexible’ 
among the extreme hard pegs, for that special reason.  Countries may alternatively cherish 
the idea of adopting a currency board with a longer-term aim in mind. For these countries, the 
timing of appropriate prerequisite reforms is paramount. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 This is the “fear of floating” argument. Given that balance sheets are characterised by currency mismatches, they 
are exposed to currency risks. Countries that have a high pass through parameter and high degree of wage 
indexation ( with deep-seated entrenched expectations of inflation) also suffer from that fear. 
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Table 16: General Characteristics of Economies adopting a particular Exchange 
Rate Regime 
 
General (descriptive) characteristics of 
economies adopting a particular 
exchange rate regime 
 
Exchange-Rate Regime 
 
 -   Economies that want credibility required 
in the aftermath of a monetary disorder 
but that want to retain the flexibility of an 
‘exit’ option in bad times and avoid the 
straightjacket of lost revenues and lost 
monetary sovereignty 
 
- Economies lack pre-requisites for floating 
regimes and institutional changes 
required for successful credible 
alternative ( e.g inflation targeting) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURRENCY BOARDS 
  
- Economies are well integrated with USA;  
- Economy already uses dollars 
extensively (liability dollarization is an all 
encompassing  reality);  
- Economy cannot take advantage of 
exchange rate as ‘exit’ option for 
adjustment to external shocks 
 
 
 
 
 
DOLLARIZATION 
 
- Economy cannot pre-commit to lower 
inflation rates ex-post  
 
 
CRAWLING PEGS 
 
 
- Economy wants to maintain credibility 
advantages of a peg but wants a 
mechanism that provides adjustment to 
external shocks 
- Economy has a diversified trade structure 
 
 
 
 
BASKET PEGS 
  
- Economy looks for political and economic 
advantages involved in harmonising 
trade and monetary regimes: individual 
advantage lies in being members of a 
larger economic space 
 
 
 
 
MONETARY UNIONS 
 
 
 
Economy wants to enjoy advantages of 
monetary independence whilst being 
integrated in global financial markets. 
Exchange rate can be used as a response to 
external shocks 
 
Pre-requisites for inflation targeting satisfied: 
central bank independence, no commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
PURE FLOATING REGIMES + INFLATION  
TARGETING 
 36
to alternative targets, reactive monetary 
policy to exchange rate fluctuations (as long 
as these influence the target), mechanism for 
forecasting future inflation levels 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This essay reviews the literature on currency board arrangements and highlights the rationale 
behind adopting such extreme form of arrangements. We have classified countries into three 
categories – those that adopt currency boards to end a financial chaos overnight, those that 
wish to adopt a credible medium-term exchange-rate based stabilization programme and 
those that wish to use currency boards as long term monetary strategy. We argue that for 
economies with a short-term horizon, currency boards deliver fast results. For economies with 
a medium and long-term perspective, institutional factors must be present as pre-requisites 
for currency boards to work. We argue that these institutional factors are needed to ensure 
consistency of domestic policy aims with the external goal for which the currency board 
arrangement has been set up. For those economies wishing to import long term monetary 
credibility, we rationalise the case for the adoption of a crawling peg system, as temporary 
arrangement, that will help maintain benefits and contain costs of transition to a fully 
operational currency board.  
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8. Appendix 
 
 
          Table 17 : Benefits and Drawbacks of Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Benefits Drawbacks 
Credibility / Anchor / Disciplining device 
- anchor for private expectations and 
monetary policy 
- exchange-rate based stabilization 
programme 
Open-economy trilemma – no independent 
monetary policy is possible 
For economies that face relative pre-
eminence of financial shocks, pegs can help 
achieve output stabilization 
Speculative currency attacks with enhanced 
global financial integration 
If pegged regimes comprises a group of 
regional countries, there is considerable 
economy on transaction costs and exchange 
rate risks 
Targeting a monetary variable (i.e the 
exchange rate) in the face of changing 
variables, can be de-stabilising for banks if 
successful targeting means big interest rate 
fluctuations 
For economies that lack domestic financial 
sophistication and whose liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currencies, a peg 
may help dissuade the “fear-of-floating” 
argument 
Pegs provide no room for adjustment of 
nominal exchange rate in face of external 
shocks that move the real exchange rate 
away from its equilibrium level 
 In cases involving imported inflation, pegs 
present countries with a dilemma: either 
stabilize the inflation rate or stabilize the 
exchange rate but not both. 
 Pegs are not appropriate for economies that 
want credibility device but that cannot pre-
commit to reduce inflation rate ex-post (see 
Note 1 after table 1). 
 Pegs usually present countries with the 
option of using currency devaluations as last 
resort policy instrument, in crisis times. 
However, there is little use of that advantage 
if devaluations are contractionary by nature. 
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